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Ohio's Long Arm Statute
Frederick E. J. Pizzedaz*
T HE JUDICIAL POWER Of the State of Ohio has long been subject
to the constricting influence of Pennoyer v. Neff, from
which case the territorialist theory of jurisdiction evolved:
Process from the tribunals of one State cannot run into
another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave
its territory and respond to proceedings against them.'
The 106th General Assembly of the Ohio Legislature, how-
ever, in response to the necessity of keeping abreast with modern
society and the vastly increased mobility of its members, enacted
into law Sections 2307.381 to 2307.385 inclusive, of the Ohio Re-
vised Code.2 Collectively these sections are popularly known as
the "long-arm" statute.
* BA., Western Reserve Univ.; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College; Chief Disposition Officer, Division
of Urban Renewal, City of Cleveland.
1 95 U. S. 714, 727 (1878).
2 Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 2307.381 to 2307.385, inclusive, effective September
28, 1965. (H. B. 406). It provides:
Section 2307.381. "Person" includes an individual, his executor, admin-
istrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, as-
sociation, or any other legal or commercial entity, who is a non-resident of
this state.
Section 2307.382. (A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising
from the person's:
(1) Transacting any business in this state;
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside
this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty
expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state ... .
provided that he also regularly does or solicits business . . . (etc.) . . . in
this state;
(6) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this
state;
(7) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within
this state at the time of contracting. (Emphasis added).
Provision is made for personal service outside the state; and causes of
action unrelated to the enumerated acts are prohibited. The pre-existing
means of obtaining jurisdiction are continued.
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The purpose of this note is to attempt to estimate the extent
to which Ohio will utilize the statute, based on the experience of
other states having case law on the subject, since there has been
no litigation as yet under the statute in Ohio. Discussion is
basically limited to the questions of transacting business and of
tortious conduct, as these are the most frequently litigated facets
of such statutes.
Background
With the enactment of the "long-arm," Ohio has joined the
growing number of states which have responded to the "min-
imum-contracts" doctrine-test set forth in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington; 3 i.e., has the defendant done something in the
forum state or to residents in the forum state in such a manner
as to make it fair and reasonable that the defendant be compelled
to defend in the forum state?
This represented a discarding of the earlier theories of Pen-
noyer v. Neff4 which held that a State could only render a
judgment binding on a defendant personally if that defendant
was physically present and served with process while in the
forum state, and Simon v. Southern Ry.,5 which held that, in the
case of a defendant non-resident corporation, that entity must
have, by implication, consented to the court's jurisdiction. The
test of corporate consent was whether or not the company was
"doing business" within the forum state.6
Ensuing decisions picked away at the foundation of this
theory, however,7 until the Supreme Court announced the "min-
imum contacts" doctrine in International Shoe, thus laying to
rest the theories of constructive presence and implied consent,
and instead asked merely if a defendant corporation had certain
"minimum contacts" within the forum state "such that the
3 326 U. S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 (1945).
4 95 U. S. 714 (1878).
5 236 U. S. 115, 35 S. Ct. 255 (1915).
6 L N. Price v. Davis, 22 Ohio App. 388, 153 N. E. 529 (1923); Golden Dawn
Foods, Inc. v. Cekuta, 1 Ohio App. 2d 464, 205 N. E. 2d 121 (1964), which
held that "each case rests on its own facts."
7 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 55 S. Ct. 553 (1935),
which held that service could be made on the agent of a non-resident secu-
rities dealer insofar as service concerned obligations arising from transac-
tions in the forum state; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457, 61 S. Ct. 339
(1940), where the court held that an absent defendant could be sued in the
courts of the state of his domicile.
May, 1966
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss2/19
OHIO'S LONG ARM STATUTE
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional nations of fair
play and substantial justice." 8
The principles established by International Shoe are not to
be construed as carte blanche authority, however. Single or iso-
lated activities as a basis for unrelated causes of action will not
suffice to subject a non-domiciliary foreign corporation to suit.9
However, as to related causes of action, fair play and justice are
not compromised if the defendant be forced to appear for suit in
the forum state, since that defendant has taken advantage of the
opportunity of conducting activities within the forum, thus plac-
ing itself within the benefits and under the protection of the
forum state's law.10
The Supreme Court affirmed International Shoe" with its
opinion in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,1" decided
twelve years later. There, a cause of action arose from the de-
livery of an insurance contract directly solicited by a non-
resident insurer to its insured within the state of California. In
upholding minimum contact jurisdiction resting on a state statute
which subjected the company to personal jurisdiction of that
state, the Supreme Court conceded that the suit would be in-
convenient to the insurer but "was certainly nothing which
amounts to a denial of due process." 13 The Court held that "it is
sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on
a contract which had substantial connection with that state." 14
The court went one step further and stated that even a single
contract made by the defendant would subject it to jurisdiction
if that contract had a substantial connection "with the public
policy interests of the forum state." 5
However, the court felt compelled to further explain its
position the following term in Hanson v. Denckla,16 when it
8 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 3.
9 Id. at 317 (dicta).
10 "The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and so far as
those obligations arise out of or are connected with activities within a state,
a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." Id. at
319.
11 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 3.
12 355 U. S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199, 1 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1957).
13 Id. at 224.
14 Id. at 223.
15 Id. at 225.
16 357 U. S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958).
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rejected the idea that a basis for jurisdiction could be created
merely by finding "the center of gravity" of the controversy, or
the most convenient location for litigation.
17
In denying jurisdiction over a non-resident trustee whose
sole contact with the forum state was by correspondence with
his settlor, who had moved to the forum state after establishing
the trust, the court in Hanson stated that an essential element to
jurisdiction is that the defendant do some act by which he
availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within
that state. The non-resident act or contract, however, must be
a direct and voluntary one.' 8
The "Long-Arm" of Illinois and New York
Based on the wide latitude afforded by International Shoe
and subsequent decisions, Illinois enacted the first comprehensive
"long-arm" statute. 19 Though not the first state to assert juris-
diction over the subject matter elucidated in the statute, 20
Illinois was the first state to attempt occupation of the entire
spectrum of its constitutional power following the Supreme
Court's liberalization of the due process clause. Many states
followed Illinois' lead and adopted statutes based upon that of
Illinois.2 1
The first test of the Illinois statute concerned the section on
tortious acts. In Nelson v. Miller22 the Illinois Supreme Court
17 Id. at 254. "In McGee the court noted the trend of expanding personal
jurisdiction over non-residents . . . But it is a mistake to assume that this
trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal juris-
diction of state courts." Id. at 250-51.
18 Id. at 254.
19 Ill. Laws 1955, pp. 2238, 2245-46, Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 110, Sec. 17 (1963). See,
generally, Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L. F. 533.
20 In 1937, Maryland provided for suits arising from contracts made or acts
done within the state. Md. Acts 1937, c. 504, Sec. 118, at 1057, now Md. Ann.
Code art. 23, Sec. 92(d) (1957); see also Vt. Laws 1937, No. 40, now Vt. Stat.
Ann. Tit. 12 Sec. 855 (1958), where Vermont provided for suits arising from
contracts to be performed or torts committed "in whole or in part" there.
Additionally, in 1937, Pennsylvania provided for jurisdiction in suits arising
from the ownership or use of real property within the state, Pa. Laws 1937,
No. 558, now Pa. Stat. Ann. Tit. 12, Sec. 331 (1953). The Uniform Un-
authorized Insurers Act, providing for jurisdiction over those insuring resi-
dents of the forum state, had its inception in 1938, and was adopted in sev-
eral states. 9 C Uniform Laws Ann. 308, Sec. 5 (1938).
21 Including Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Mexico, New York, and Wash-
ington.
22 11 Il. 2d 378, 143 N. E. 2d 673 (1958).
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stated that, for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction, a "tortious
act" is an act that would be tortious if proved as alleged. To
hold otherwise would necessitate hearing the merits prior to a
determination of jurisdiction.23
Additionally, the court declared in Nelson that the Illinois
statute intended to assert jurisdiction to the fullest constitutional
extent. In answer to due-process objections, the Court upheld
the statute by applying the minimum contacts and fairness tests
of International Shoe.
Following Nelson v. Miller, there were other cases which
upheld jurisdiction based on the Section 17 tort provision, where
either the defendant or his agent physically entered the State
of Illinois and therein committed an act alleged to be tortious.24
Though most cases adjudicated have involved Illinois res-
idents as plaintiffs, Section 17 is not so limited by express lan-
guage. A nonresident plaintiff may well fall within the protection
of the statute.25
Before New York enacted its "long-arm" statute [CLPR
302] 26 a foreign corporation could not be considered "present"
for jurisdictional purposes unless it had systematic and regular
contacts with New York. It had to be doing business in the state.
Justice Cardozo set out the test in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co.: 27
If it (corporation) is here, not occasionally, or casually, but
with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then it
is within the jurisdiction of our Courts.28
This "presence" test was the New York guideline until the
Supreme Court set out the "minimum contacts" theory in Inter-
23 "An act or omission within the State, in person or by an agent, is a suffi-
cient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
act or omission gives rise to liability in tort." Id. at 393-94, 143 N. E. 2d at
681.
24 Star v. Rogalny, 162 F. Supp. 181 (E. D. Ill. 1957), (non-resident motor-
ist); Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790 (N. D. Inl. 1958),
(airplane crash); Riinc, Inc. v. Peddie, 195 F. Supp. 124 (E. D. II. 1961)
(ship collision in waters subject to Ill. jurisdiction).
25 See, generally, Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Ex-
tended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L. F. 533.
26 N. Y. Sess. Law 1962, c. 308, Sec. 302, approved by the Governor April 4,
1962. See, generally, Kellog, Transacting Business as Jurisdictional Basis-
A Survey of New York case law, 14 Buffalo L. R. 525 (1964-65).
27 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917).
28 Id. at 262.
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national Shoe v. Washington.29 To take advantage of that holding
meant passing a statute, which New York did not do until 1962.
Thus, until passage of CLPR 302 was enacted, New York's in
personam jurisdiction was based on a narrower foundation than
that permitted by the due process clause of the United States
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
However, under Tauza, a foreign corporation doing business
in New York was amenable to suit for a cause of action, even
if that cause did not arise from New York business dealings. In
this respect, CLPR 302 is not as liberal, as in personam jurisdic-
tion under the statute will lie only for a cause of action related
to the transaction of business.
In Brunette Sunapee Corp. v. Zeolux Corp.,30 the court dis-
missed a breach of warranty and negligence action against an
Illinois Corporation, since none of the elements of the action
arose out of transacting business in New York. Defendant, a
washing machine manufacturer, made the machine in Illinois,
sold it in Massachusetts, and the machines were thereafter in-
stalled in New Hampshire by the Massachusetts purchaser. After
installation, the machine failed to operate. The court held that
there was no transaction of business in New York, though the
defendant was a wholly owned subsidiary of a New York cor-
poration.
In Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 31 the court had held that a
cause of action arising out of a contract entered into in New
York constituted a "transaction" of business. The court went
even further in Iroquois Gas Corp. v. Collins,3 2 where the de-
fendant, a Texas resident, denied entering into an alleged con-
tract to build a pipeline across the Niagara River for the plaintiff.
Defendant had sent agents into New York to survey the area
and do other preliminary work relating to the proposed contract
on two separate occasions. The court held that this activity, in
furtherance of the contract by non-resident defendant's agents,
constituted "a transaction and established the necessary con-
tacts." Even though the contract had not been proved, the court
stated that "it was enough that the defendant availed himself of
the privilege of conducting business activity in New York, thus
29 Supra note 3.
30 228 F. Supp. 805 (S. D. N. Y. 1964).
31 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245 N. Y. S. 2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
32 42 Misc. 2d 632, 248 N. Y. S. 2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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invoking the benefit and protection of the law." 33 (Emphasis
added.)
The court concluded Iroquois by stating that if there was no
contract the defendant could establish this fact at a later hearing,
on the merits. But for purposes of jurisdiction, activity in fur-
therance of the contract was enough.
The Iroquois decision was influenced by the Illinois case of
Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz,3 4 where the facts were similar. The
defendant in Kropp denied the existence of a contract but visited
plaintiff's premises in Illinois, there communicating with plain-
tiff's employees. The court found that "either the making" of
the alleged contract itself, or activity in furtherance of it, while
the defendant was physically present with the business shown
to have been transacted by the defendant in Illinois.
The Iroquois case and the New York case of Longine-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke35 both placed con-
siderable stress on the physical presence of the defendant or its
agent in the forum state, for purposes in furtherance of a con-
tract. In Longine-Wittnauer, extensive contract negotiations for
the sale of two machines took place in New York. Additionally,
the machines were installed and tested within the state, requir-
ing the presence of defendant's officials and employees.
In the alternative, if a contract was negotiated elsewhere
but executed within the state, would there be sufficient basis for
the granting of jurisdiction? New York seemed to think so in
Lewis v. American Archives Assn.,3 6 where the plaintiff, an at-
torney, was retained by a non-resident defendant in a contract
of employment executed in New York. The contract covered
activities to be performed for the defendant by the plaintiff in
the state. Defendant's employee made one visit to New York for
a conference with the plaintiff on matters directly relating to the
contract. In upholding jurisdiction, the court said that there had
been "sufficient contact." It stated that the intent of the New
York legislature was to make nondomiciliaries more accessible
to the jurisdiction of the New York courts, "thus affording
greater protection to the resident of this state."
The "tortious act" provision of the New York statute was
83 Id. at 634.
84 37 111. App. 2d 475, 186 N. E. 2d 76 (1962).
35 21 App. Div. 2d 474, 251 N. Y. S. 2d 740 (1964).
86 43 Misc. 2d 721, 252 N. Y. S. 2d 217 (1964).
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the jurisdictional basis sought by the plaintiff in Singer v.
Walker.37 There, a geologist's hammer was manufactured in
Illinois by an Illinois Corporation which labeled the hammer
"unbreakable" and shipped it to a New York retailer, who sold
it to plaintiff's aunt. She, in turn, gave it to plaintiff who used
it on a Connecticut field trip, where the hammer fragmented,
injuring plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed jurisdiction
over the defendant, but not on the "tortious act" provision, hold-
ing that "tortious acts of manufacturing and labeling the hammer
occurred in Illinois and are insufficient to satisfy the require-
ments of paragraph 2 [CLPR 302 (a) (2)] that the 'tortious act'
be one committed 'within' the state." The court did uphold
jurisdiction on the "transacting business" paragraph of the
statute, stating that ". .. (it) is not limited to actions in contract
and applies to tort actions when supported by a sufficient show-
ing of facts." 38 The court in Singer deemed it not controlling
that the injury occurred in Connecticut or that the sales contract
was consummated in Illinois, since the cause "arose from the
purposeful activities engaged in by defendant in this State in
connection with the sale of its products in the New York
market." 39
It may be well to note that while both the Illinois and New
York statutes speak of the commission of a tortious act within
the State; the comparable section of the Ohio statute speaks of
"causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state." 40
There appears to be a definite distinction in the wording of the
statutes. If one may assume that a tort may be found to exist
separately from its consequences, the distinction becomes more
lucid.
Of course, where the act and its consequences are closely
related, it is impractical to separate the two; e.g., negligently
shooting another person with a bow and arrow, causing injury
to that person.
However, where the alleged tortious act consists of the
negligent manufacture or sale of a product, and the consequences
arise in a distant location, after a substantial lapse of time, it is
37 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N. Y. S. 2d 216 (1964), affd. 15 N. Y. 2d 443
(1965).
38 Id. at 444.
39 Id. at 445.
40 Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 2307.382 (A) (3).
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logical to distinguish between the act and the damage or conse-
quences arising therefrom, particularly if one or more interven-
ing parties have handled the product.
In Hellriegal v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 41 a lawn mower was
manufactured in Ohio by an Ohio corporation, the mower's
power unit being manufactured by a Wisconsin corporation. The
unit was shipped to Ohio, placed on the mower, then sold in
Ohio to defendant, an Illinois corporation. The mower was
eventually sold to plaintiff's father, proved defective, and re-
sulted in injury to plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that a "tortious
act within the state" had occurred, under the theory that the
negligent manufacture constituted a tortious act in Illinois, where
the injury, or consequence, occurred. The Federal Court refused
to grant jurisdiction, stating that the words "commission of a
tortious act" mean the same thing as "commission of a tort." 42
The court further reasoned that the term "tortious act" was
intended by the legislature to distinguish between a whole tort
and the base act apart from its consequences. Implicit in that
decision is the conclusion that consequences alone are insufficient
to bring a non-resident within the jurisdiction of Illinois law.
The Illinois Supreme Court reached the furthest limits of
jurisdictional construction in Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp.43 In that case, defendant, American
Radiator, purchased a safety valve from defendant manufacturer
in Ohio. The valve was placed on a hot water tank constructed
by defendant in Pennsylvania, which tank was then sold by
defendant's dealer to plaintiff in Illinois. The valve proved de-
fective, causing the tank to explode and injure the plaintiff, who
attempted to assert jurisdiction over defendant manufacturer on
the ground that a tortious act had been committed within the
state so as to bring defendant within the scope of the Illinois
statute. The court applied the "place of effect" theory of tort
law in construing the statute, holding it immaterial that the
defendant had not itself introduced the defective valve into
Illinois, because the valve had been "presumably sold in con-
templation of use here." The court continued:
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its
products for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust
4' 157 F. Supp. 718 (N. D. Ill. 1957).
42 Id. at 720, citing Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N. E. 2d 673 (1957).
43 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761 (1961).
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to hold it answerable here for any damage caused by defects
in those products, where the alleged liability arises, as in
this case, from the manufacture of products presumably
sold in contemplation of use here, it should not matter that
the purchase was made from an independent middle-man or
that someone other than the defendant shipped the product
into this state.44
The Gray case represented a departure from the theretofore
cautious flexing of the Illinois "long-arm." That this case has not
been universally followed was demonstrated by the Federal
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in its opinion in
McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co.,45 decided shortly after Gray.
This court, which had rendered the Hellriegal v. Sears Roebuck
& Co. 46 opinion four years earlier, stated that the Illinois legis-
lature never intended the Illinois courts to assume jurisdiction
over cases "where the complaint does not allege acts or omissions
performed within the State of Illinois, rather only the injury is
alleged to have occurred in Illinois." 47
New York case law has indicated a trend towards expansion
of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. Generally, however,
the court has been able to find some affirmative act or omission
within the state upon which to base jurisdiction. 48
The New York cases seem to confirm the contention that
there remains a necessity of finding some physical presence
within the forum state in order to impose jurisdiction under the
statute.
The New York case of Greenberg v. R. S. P. Realty Corp.
49
perhaps represents the furthest reach thus far in that state.
44 Id. at 442.
45 199 F. Supp. 908 (N. D. Ill. 1961). See also Insull v. New York World
Tel. Corp., 273 F. 2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
46 157 F. Supp. 718 (N. D. Ill. 1957).
47 McMahon v. Boeing Aircraft Co., supra note 45.
48 In Fornabaio v. Swissair Transport Co. Ltd., 247 N. Y. S. 2d 203 (1964),
jurisdiction was based on the defendant's products being used within the
state in sufficient numbers, coupled with defendant's knowledge that its
products would be sold and used in the state; Lewin v. Boch Laundry Ma-
chine Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 249 N. Y. S. 2d 49 (1964), jurisdiction granted on
defendant's reasonable expectation that its products would be sold and used
in N. Y., coupled with defendant's past record of substantial sales and dis-
tribution in the N. Y. market.
49 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (Sup. Ct. 1964); contra, Borges v.
Pipher, 152 N. Y. L. J., Oct. 28, 1964, p. 22, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). Contra, see
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Defendant hotel corporation solicited business through advertise-
ments in New York newspapers. Plaintiff confirmed her reserva-
tions by a direct line telephone placed in New York by defendant
New Jersey hotel. The New York court granted jurisdiction on
the basis of transacting business, even though the suit sounded
on a tort committed in New Jersey.
New York's statute recently came under constitutional at-
tack in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co.50 Justice Goldberg
delivered the opinion and, after finding that the defendant had
committed an international tort while physically present in New
York, stated that a "single tort is enough to bring one under the
statute, which is constitutional." The test set out in that case is
that "the defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated
to have an effect in the forum state." 51 (Emphasis added.)
Conclusion
It can be readily seen, from the foregoing discussion, that
there is a divergence in opinion among the authorities as to how
far the "long-arm" statutes reach.
Ohio, with its newly enacted statute, will shortly be faced,
in its courts, with the obligation to interpret the statute. At that
point, the courts must determine whether or not they will grant
jurisdiction under the statute to the fullest extent of the constitu-
tional power allowed by the United States Supreme Court or, in
the alternative, take a conservative approach and progress slowly
with this new power, relying on the case law of other jurisdic-
tions for guidelines.
If Ohio courts choose the former path, in an omnibus attempt
to "balance the conveniences" between a plaintiff, normally an
individual, and a defendant, usually a large enterprise, there may
evolve a caveat to corporations, insurance companies, and other
businesses, with their vast horizontal and vertical structures.
Corporations might well avoid marketing their goods or services
freely within the state if to do so would avoid the possibility of
subjecting themselves to in personam jurisdiction for even the
50 22 A. D. 2d 854, 254 N. Y. S. 2d 81 (1964), aff'd. w.o. opinion, 16 N. Y.
2d 621, 261 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (1965), aff'd., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965).
51 Id. at 4. Facts; an employee of plaintiff stole documents in N. Y., went
to Italy, and there conspired with defendant to sell the documents. The
defendant came to N. Y., inspected the documents, and there paid part of
the purchase price before returning to Italy. The plaintiff was a Maine
corp. doing business in N. Y.
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remotest transaction. The subsequent impediment of goods and
services flowing freely between this state and other jurisdictions
could well result in adverse economic conditions.
It is more likely that Ohio will follow the latter choice. The
recent case of Schneider v. Laffoon 52 lends weight to this po-
sition.
Where the Ohio General Assembly has adopted statutory
provisions from another state after those provisions have
been construed by the highest court of that state, such con-
struction will be given great weight in this state and will
usually be followed. 53
To ascertain jurisdiction on a case by case approach is to do
full justice to the rights of the respective parties in suit. This is
in accord with the general philosophy that has historically
evolved with construction of any new statute expanding judicial
powers.
52 4 Ohio St. 2d 89, 212 N. E. 2d 801 (1965). See, also, McNary v. State, 128
Ohio St. 497, 191 N. E. 733 (1934); Chapel State Theater Co. v. Hooper, 123
Ohio St. 332, 175 N. E. 450, aff'd. 284 U. S. 588, 52 S. Ct. 137, 76 L. Ed. 508
(1931); 50 Ohio Jur. 2d 282, Sec. 299.
53 Id. at 806.
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